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Abstract 
In 1991, the Australian Commonwealth Parliament unanimously passed the 
Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation Act 1991. This Act implemented a ten-
year process that aimed to reconcile Indigenous and non-Indigenous people 
by the end of 2000. One of the main goals of the reconciliation process was to 
develop a continuing national commitment to address Indigenous socio-
economic disadvantage in the areas of health, education, housing, 
employment and law. However, this goal was not achieved by the conclusion 
of the reconciliation process at the end of 2000. 
 
In this paper, I examine the failure of this socio-economic goal. First, I briefly 
discuss the appalling levels of Indigenous socio-economic disadvantage. 
Second, I argue that two interrelated factors significantly contributed to the 
failure to develop a national commitment to address Indigenous socio-
economic disadvantage during the reconciliation process. These factors were 
the Government approaches to addressing Indigenous socio-economic 
disadvantage and non-Indigenous people’s attitudes and understandings 




The Australian formal reconciliation process ran from 1991 to 2000. One of its 
main goals was to foster a national commitment to address Indigenous socio-
economic disadvantage in the areas of health, overrepresentation in custody, 
education, housing and employment. In this paper, I argue that this national 
commitment was not developed throughout the ten-year reconciliation 
process. First, I briefly outline some examples of the appalling Indigenous 
socio-economic disadvantage that occurred during the reconciliation process. 
Second, I examine the two primary causes of the failure to develop a national 
commitment: government policies, particularly at a Commonwealth level, and 
the attitudes of the wider, non-Indigenous community. These two causes are 
clearly related; government policies are influenced by the apathy and hostility 
of the wider community towards Indigenous people and wider community 




Despite some improvements in a few isolated areas, overall there was no 
improvement in any of the above-mentioned socio-economic areas for 
Indigenous people over the ten-year reconciliation process. A range of 
indicators in each of these areas illustrated that firstly, there is an enormous 
level of disadvantage between Indigenous people and the wider community 
and, secondly, overall Indigenous disadvantage in these areas either 
stagnated or even worsened over the reconciliation process. For space 
reasons, I only illustrate two indicators in each of the above-mentioned socio-
economic areas, including those often mentioned such as life expectancy and 
deaths in custody. However, numerous other indicators not considered in this 
paper also illustrate the significant and often worsening levels of socio-
economic disadvantage experienced by Indigenous people during the 
reconciliation process (see for example Altman and Hunter 2003; Gunstone 
2007; Hunter and Schwab 2003).  
 
Life expectancy, defined as “the average number of years a person born in a 
particular year can expect to live if the age specific rates of mortality at that 
time continue to apply”, for Indigenous people at the end of the twentieth 
century was approximately 20 years less than for the wider community (AMA 
2002, 2). Infant mortality rate, defined as “the number of deaths of children 
under one year of age per 1,000 live births”, has remained about two and a 
half times that of the total Australian population since the early 1980s (AMA 
2002, 2).  
 
The proportion of Indigenous deaths in custody was approximately 18 percent 
of all deaths in custody during the 1990s compared to 12.1 percent for the 
previous decade (Collins and Mouzos 2001, 2; Neill 2002, 212). The 
proportion of Indigenous prisoners was approximately 20 percent of all 
prisoners in 2001 compared to 14 percent in 1991 (ABS 2001a, 9).  
 
The educational attainment, defined as “the proportion of the people aged 15 
years and over who do not have a post-secondary educational qualification”, 
for Indigenous people only improved from 90.7 percent in 1991 to 85.2 
percent in 2001 compared to the wider community which improved from 73.6 
percent to 65.3 percent in 2001 (Gray and Auld 2000, vi, 26; ABS 2002a, 
Tables I01, I14; ABS 2001b, 4). The level of school attendance, which 
impacts significantly on educational outcomes such as reading benchmarks 
and Year 12 retention rates, are extraordinarily poor for Indigenous students, 
who on average, miss more than a year of both primary and secondary 
schooling over the life of their schooling (Neill 2002, 245; CA 2000, 3). 
 
The rate of Indigenous home ownership only improved from 31 percent in 
1996 to 32 percent in 2001, compared to 71 percent for non-Indigenous 
people in both 1996 and 2001 (ABS 2002b, 233; ABS 2003, 249). Significant 
numbers of Indigenous communities lack basic components of infrastructure, 
such as adequate water, electricity and sewerage services and in 1998, a 
minimum of 20,000 Indigenous people lived in communities that had 
permanently inadequate water sources (Ring and Brown 2002, 629; Jackson 
and Ward 1999, 437). 
 
The proportion of working-age Indigenous people, neither employed nor on 
employment programs, only marginally improved from 71.4 percent in 1991 to 
66.8 percent in 2001 (Gray and Auld 2000, 24; ABS 2002a, Table I16). The 
median income level for Indigenous adults worsened from only 70 percent of 
the median income level for non-Indigenous adults in 1991 to just 59 percent 




Throughout the ten-year reconciliation process, no Commonwealth 
Government developed a national commitment to address Indigenous socio-
economic disadvantage. A major cause of this failure was the politicisation of 
Indigenous Affairs policies by both Labor and the Liberal/National Coalition. 
Both these parties generally focussed on narrow aspects of Indigenous Affairs 
policies and marginalised, or ignored, broader areas and ideas. Prominent 
Indigenous leader Noel Pearson (2002a, 11) argued that on the one hand, 
Labor has often developed, (although generally not implemented), policies on 
Indigenous rights, yet has been “weak and wrong in relation to the breakdown 
of responsibility in Aboriginal society occasioned by passive welfare 
dependency and substance abuse”, and on the other hand, the Coalition “will 
better understand the problems of responsibility, but will advocate further 
diminution of the native title property rights of Aboriginal Australians”. The 
Labor and Coalition parties focussed respectively on rights and practical 
issues (often termed ‘practical reconciliation’) and failed to understand or 
acknowledge that Indigenous Affairs policies need to both recognise 
Indigenous rights and address Indigenous socio-economic disadvantage. 
The Keating Labor Government was in office for the first five years of 
the reconciliation process, 1991 to 1996. During that time, the Keating 
Government claimed that the focus of its Indigenous Affairs policies was on 
both recognising Indigenous rights, such as native title and a limited form of 
Indigenous self-determination, (although not national land rights or a treaty), 
and symbolic issues, such as officially recognising the Aboriginal flag. 
Following their defeat at the 1996 Commonwealth election, the Labor Party 
continued to emphasise Indigenous rights and symbolic issues. Labor’s 
Indigenous Affairs policies for the 1998 election focussed predominantly on 
Indigenous rights, such as supporting Indigenous arts, the stolen generations, 
native title, heritage protection and constitutional recognition (ALP 1998, 8-
14). It is interesting to note though that Labor’s actual record in Indigenous 
Affairs while in government often contradicted its claimed emphasis on 
Indigenous rights. In the 1990s, the Labor Government restricted Indigenous 
self-determination, through the imposition of the unpopular Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Commission and attempted to shift the responsibility of 
addressing land rights onto the legal system following the High Court’s 1992 
Mabo decision (Milloo 1998, 27, 29). 
Further, during the 1990s, the Labor Party, when in government and in 
opposition, generally failed to adequately address Indigenous socio-economic 
disadvantage. Labor policies largely ignored or marginalised issues such as 
welfare dependency and substance abuse (Pearson 2002a, 11). For example, 
in outlining its platform for the 1998 Commonwealth election, Labor outlined 
just three policy initiatives that concerned Indigenous socio-economic 
conditions – employment programs, health and deaths in custody; it did not 
address issues of domestic violence, substance abuse or out-of-custody 
suicide (ALP 1998, 8-14). Other examples of this reluctance to examine 
issues of socio-economic disadvantage and their possible causes included 
the lack of engagement and analysis by the Labor Party concerning Noel 
Pearson’s ideas on welfare dependency and its connection to socio-economic 
disadvantage, the failure of the Labor Government in 1995 to incorporate 
commitments to improve socio-economic disadvantage into Commonwealth 
legislation to establish the Indigenous Land Corporation, and the failure of the 
Labor Cabinet in 1995 to endorse the recommendation of Robert Tickner, 
then Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs, to address 
Indigenous socio-economic disadvantage through a Centenary of Federation 
Infrastructure Project (see Pearson 2002b; Neill 2002, 53, 16-17; Tickner 
2001, 45).  
This emphasis on Indigenous rights and symbolic issues over socio-
economic disadvantage reflected the views of many of Labor’s constituency. 
Pearson (2002c) argued: 
 
Federal Labor is dominated by what I call the progressivist 
intellectual middle stratum. They have played a role in achieving 
recognition of Aboriginal people’s property rights, but I contend 
that the prejudice, social theories and thinking habits of left-
leaning, liberally-minded people make them unable to do 
anything further for Aboriginal people by attacking our real 
disadvantage factors. 
 
Following their victory at the 1996 Commonwealth election, the new 
Howard Coalition Government rejected the approach of the previous Keating 
Government to Indigenous Affairs. Indigenous leader Geoff Clark (1998, 5) 
criticised this change and argued, “from the outset, the Coalition Government 
has systematically attacked Indigenous rights”. As discussed above, the 
Howard Government focussed on practical issues – addressing socio-
economic disadvantage – rather than on symbolism and Indigenous rights.  
In emphasising practical issues, the Howard Government was also 
reflecting the views of its constituency. Several conservative commentators 
supported the Howard Government’s approach (see Albrechtsen 2002, 39; 
McGuinness 2000, 239).  
The refusal to consider symbolic issues showed the Howard 
Government to be one that failed to embrace the importance of symbolism in 
bringing some form of justice to Indigenous peoples. Also, by refusing to 
recognise Indigenous rights, such as self-determination or a treaty, the 
Howard Government failed to understand the fundamental link between 
Indigenous socio-economic disadvantage and Indigenous rights. 
Further, despite the Howard Government’s public commitment to 
practical issues, it largely failed to develop effective programs and policies to 
address this commitment (Tickner 2001, 47; Pearson 2002b). An example of 
this failure was the refusal of the Howard Government to overturn the 
Northern Territory’s mandatory sentencing legislation, instead merely 
removing juvenile offenders from the legislation’s jurisdiction (Loff 2000, 
2071). This was despite recommendations from the 1991 Royal Commission 
into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody (RCIADIC) to divert Indigenous offenders 
away from the prison system and the evidence of the increasing incarceration 
rate of Indigenous people in the Northern Territory (Loff 2000, 2071; NAALAS 
2000, 11). Another example was the changes made to Abstudy, a scheme 
designed to support Indigenous tertiary education. The mainstreaming of 
Abstudy saw a significant reduction of over 10 percent in the number of 
Indigenous people accessing both University and TAFE sectors from 1998/99 
to 1999/2000 (Brabham et al. 2002, 12).  
Another example was the lack of resources spent on Indigenous 
health. Indigenous health is about three times worse than overall Australian 
health, yet on a per capita basis, the Howard Government spent in 2002, in 
the health programs that it directly controls, only 74 cents on Indigenous 
people for every $1 spent for the wider population (Ring and Elston 1999, 
228; Ring and Brown 2002, 629). In terms of funding from all sources, in 
1998-99, for every one dollar spent on overall Australian health, only $1.22 
was spent on Indigenous health (AIHW 2001, 2). Further, in the two main 
Commonwealth-funded health programs - Medicare and the Pharmaceutical 
Benefits Scheme - the level of expenditure for each Indigenous person was 
only 37 percent of the level of expenditure for each non-Indigenous person 
and overall the two programs only contributed 7.3 percent of the total amount 
spent on Indigenous health, compared to 23.9 percent of the total amount 
spent on non-Indigenous health (AIHW 2001, xiv). Finally, from 1995-96 to 
1998-99, the proportion of funding spent on Indigenous health from the overall 
health funding area, (including Commonwealth, State, Territory and Local 
Governments, private health insurance and out-of-pocket expenses), only 
increased from 2.2 percent to 2.6 percent (AIHW 2001, 16; AIHW 2002, 211). 
Ring and Elston (1999, 231) argued, “the current situation [in funding for 
Indigenous health], where the Commonwealth is spending perhaps a fifth of 
what it should be spending on a needs basis, is a major impediment to 
effective reconciliation”.  
These examples suggest that the Howard Government’s new approach 
to Indigenous Affairs was based less on attempting to improve policy and 
more on simply rejecting the previous Keating Government’s policies. This 
approach by the Howard Government was also driven by opinion polls and 
populist policies. 
Altman and Hunter (2003) also questioned the effectiveness of 
Howard’s emphasis on practical issues. In examining socio-economic 
outcomes for Indigenous people throughout the 1991-2000 reconciliation 
process, they compared the socio-economic outcomes for Indigenous people 
in the Keating era and the Howard era. They concluded that, “while practical 
reconciliation forms the rhetorical basis for Indigenous policy development 
since 1996, there is no evidence that the Howard governments have delivered 
better outcomes for Indigenous Australians than their predecessors” (Altman 
and Hunter 2003, v; see also Hunter and Schwab 2003, 94-96; Ross 2001, 
155). 
There are several other ways in which both Labor and Coalition 
Governments, at Commonwealth and State levels, have failed to develop a 
national commitment to address Indigenous socio-economic disadvantage. 
One of these was the approach by Governments to Indigenous self-
determination. During the reconciliation process, Governments often used the 
policy of self-determination as a justification for ignoring Indigenous 
community problems. This avoidance of government responsibility ensured 
that Indigenous community problems, such as domestic violence, substance 
abuse and suicide, remained largely unacknowledged by Governments and 
consequently, the problems have continued to have a devastating impact 
upon Indigenous communities (Tucak 2002, 16). All levels of Government 
have largely abdicated their responsibility on these issues and placed them 
onto Indigenous communities. Not only Labor Governments, but even 
Coalition Governments, with their hostile views on self-determination, have 
used the mantra of self-determination to avoid accepting responsibility for 
Indigenous community violence and for failing to develop policies concerning 
Indigenous social problems (Neill 2002, 22-23, 85-86; Saunders 2002, 17).  
This abdication of responsibility failed to recognise that it was often 
government policies that led to many of these community problems. For 
example, a report written for the Cape York Health Council in 2000 “details 
the level of pressure the Queensland Government placed on communities to 
open beer canteens in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, often against their 
wishes”, for the purposes of providing an alternative source of income from 
Government funding (Gordon 2001, 3). 
In addition to accepting their responsibilities, Governments also should 
acknowledge the importance of Indigenous self-determination by ensuring 
that they adequately support and fund Indigenous organisations and 
communities in their efforts to reduce Indigenous socio-economic 
disadvantage. Genuine Indigenous self-determination, not merely 
Government rhetoric, remains an important component of improving 
Indigenous health, overrepresentation in custody, education, housing and 
employment. However, during 1972 to 1996, when Indigenous self-
determination was generally Commonwealth Government policy, all 
Governments largely determined for themselves to what extent their self-
determination policies would operate. It can be argued that genuine self-
determination has never been fully implemented; the policies often masked 
bureaucratic paternalism (Godwell 2003, 11). But any meaningful address to 
Indigenous socio-economic disadvantage must involve Indigenous self-
determination. In discussing the importance of genuine self-determination for 
his own communities, Pearson (2000a, 80) argued the need for:  
 
Self-determination and our right to autonomy - Cape York 
Peninsula people must control our own representative 
organisations and must be free from arbitrary interference from 
the state and external quarters. Our regional, community and 
local structures – whilst having relations with government and 
outside agencies – must be independent and accountable to our 
own community. 
 
Self-determination also means that Indigenous people should be able 
to decide for themselves their own lifestyles and priorities and these might not 
necessarily be the same as those preferred by the wider community. If this 
“choice in Aboriginal affairs policy is taken seriously and logically, it renders 
somewhat inappropriate and undesirable the simple and categorical pursuit of 
statistical equality between Aborigines and other Australians as a policy or 
program goal” (Sanders 1991, 17). Most Governments failed to recognise 
that, while there is an urgent need to address Indigenous socio-economic 
disadvantage, Governments should not focus too heavily on statistical 
equality, a concept that can be argued to be “vaguely ‘assimilationist’” 
(Sanders 1991, 17).   
Another factor behind the failure of Governments to foster a national 
commitment to address Indigenous socio-economic disadvantage was the 
lack of cooperation and coordination between all levels of government in 
developing and implementing programs to address this disadvantage 
(Anderson 1997; Ryan 1999, 28). Some attempts were made to improve this 
situation. Aboriginal Health Framework Agreements were developed that 
attempted to recognise the roles and responsibilities of Commonwealth and 
State Governments as well as the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Commission and local Indigenous organisations (Anderson 1999, 232). In 
1995, the Office for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Health Services was 
established in the Commonwealth Department of Health in a successful 
attempt to improve the coordination of programs (Eades 2000, 469). Also, 
some recognition within Governments occurred of the need for coordinated 
national efforts to address Indigenous socio-economic disadvantage (CA 
2000, 8). However, despite isolated efforts like these, during the ten-year 
reconciliation process, many Indigenous communities were crushed under the 
bureaucratic weight of numerous socio-economic programs being 
administered by varying levels of Government (Pearson 2000b, 170-171; 
Gordon 2001, 126). 
There was also much wasting of resources through the lack of 
cooperation and rivalry between Commonwealth, State and Territory 
Governments. An example of this waste was in the education sector of the 
Northern Territory. Collins (1999, 57) argued that the Northern Territory 
Government levied Commonwealth funds for Indigenous education at a rate 
of 46.1 percent for ‘on-costs’, compared to on-costs in other states of between 
4 and 18.6 percent. The Territory Government also failed to access 
Commonwealth funding for Indigenous education due to “tensions” between 
the two Governments, thus resulting, in one instance, of the Territory 
Government accessing only $196,000 out of a possible $38 million available 
from the Commonwealth (Collins 1999, 55). National, coordinated approaches 
to addressing Indigenous socio-economic disadvantage need to be 
undertaken by all levels of Government, local Indigenous communities and by 
a genuinely representative national Indigenous organisation.  
Further, all levels of Government have often marginalised or even 
ignored reports that identified disparities between Indigenous people and the 
wider Australian population in a range of socio-economic areas. Rather than 
implementing the recommendations, governments and bureaucrats often did 
not pay sufficient attention and committed few resources to these reports 
(Ring and Brown 2002, 629-630; Ring and Brown 2003, 4-5). For example, 
the Commonwealth, State and Territory Governments did not implement a 
large number of recommendations from the RCIADIC. Also, Maree 
O’Halloran, the President of the NSW Teachers Federation, argued that the 
NSW Government abandoned a review of its Indigenous education policy 
because it feared having the “damaging results” of its policies publicised prior 
to the State election (Doherty 2003, 4). A report into Indigenous education in 
the Northern Territory, Learning Lessons, found that successive Northern 
Territory governments and bureaucrats often failed to make any attempt to 
address concerns over Indigenous education, instead trying to hide the 
failings of the education system:  
 
For decades there has been no interest at departmental or 
governmental level in a dispassionate analysis of the 
educational outcomes of Indigenous students. Indeed, the 
review received credible evidence from current and former 
departmental officers that there had been a deliberate approach 
of burying or ‘toning down’ information about the poor results 
being achieved by Indigenous students (Collins 1999, 47). 
 
Following the release of this report, the Northern Territory Government 
initially continued to obfuscate over their responsibility to address weaknesses 
in the education system. Gordon (2001, 88) stated that although Shane 
Stone, the then Northern Territory Chief Minister, argued that the Territory 
spent a disproportionate amount on Indigenous education as “’40 per cent of 
our education budget is spent on 25 per cent of the population’”, Stone 
neglected to add that almost 40 percent of the students in the education 
system were Indigenous students. Thus the Territory spent approximately the 
same amount proportionally on Indigenous education as they did on non-
Indigenous education, notwithstanding the gross disparities in educational 
outcomes between the two groups.  
The failure of Governments to address the recommendations contained 
in reports can also be illustrated by analysing several major Commonwealth 
policies, reports and strategies on Indigenous education developed 
throughout the reconciliation process. These included the National Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander Education Policy (1993), the National Review of 
Education for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander People (1994), A National 
Strategy for the Education of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples: 
1996-2002 (1995) and The National Indigenous English Literacy and 
Numeracy Strategy 2000-2004 (2000). As these reports all contained very 
similar recommendations (DEET 1993; Yunupingu 1994; MCEETYA 1995; CA 
2000) and were published over a seven year period, it appears that 
Governments largely did not address these recommendations. Examples 
such as this illustrate that the failure of Governments to address Indigenous 
socio-economic disadvantage was often due to not implementing previously 
developed policies. 
There were several other reasons why Governments failed to foster a 
national commitment to address Indigenous disadvantage during the formal 
reconciliation process. One reason was the imposition of conditions by 
Governments on Indigenous communities in order for that community to 
receive vital services. An example of this occurred when the Northern 
Territory Government required the Jowoyn people to abandon their claim for 
native title in order to receive renal dialysis facilities (Ryan 1999, 28). Another 
reason was the failure of Commonwealth Governments to ensure that 
accurate statistics were accumulated that could have pointed to long-term and 
short-term trends in socio-economic disparities between Indigenous and non-
Indigenous people. During the 1990s, the Australian Bureau of Statistics 
(ABS) did not measure levels of improvement, or otherwise, across many 
areas of Indigenous socio-economic disadvantage, and in some areas, such 
as out-of-custody suicides, there was a dearth of reliable statistics (ABS 
2002c, 87; see also Altman and Hunter 2003, 2-3 regarding difficulties in 




The second area that indicated the lack of a national commitment to address 
Indigenous socio-economic disadvantage was a range of attitudes held by 
many in the wider, non-Indigenous community. These attitudes varied from 
apathy to a refusal to look at contemporary situations to a focus on only 
positive outcomes.  
Some non-Indigenous people hold negative or apathetic attitudes 
towards Indigenous socio-economic disadvantage, or even refuse to 
acknowledge that any Indigenous disadvantage exists. In 2000, a Newspoll 
survey on non-Indigenous attitudes to reconciliation and Indigenous issues 
found only 41 percent of respondents thought Indigenous people were a 
disadvantaged group and 60 percent felt Indigenous people received too 
much Government assistance (Newspoll 2000, 34). There are also 
considerable levels of apathy concerning Indigenous disadvantage existing 
amongst non-Indigenous people. As the significant socio-economic 
disadvantage is being experienced by Indigenous people rather than non-
Indigenous people, there is often an acceptance of the crisis and a lack of 
concern to improve the situation (Pearson 2000b, 166; Clark 2001, 12). Some 
media also demonstrate similar views on Indigenous disadvantage through 
their reinforcement of negative stereotypes, their sensationalist reporting and 
their apathy on reporting on Indigenous social issues (Neill 2002, 87-88; 
Gordon 2001, 19-21). 
An example of this lack of concern among many in the wider 
community for Indigenous socio-economic disadvantage was the support 
amongst many non-Indigenous people for mandatory sentencing regimes. 
These people largely ignored the fact that mandatory sentencing directly 
contradicted the RCIADIC’s key recommendation that Indigenous people be 
jailed only as a last resort. In the 1990s, the support for tough law and order 
policies was very strong in the wider community. The Northern Territory 
Conservative Government increased their majority at the 1997 Northern 
Territory election following its introduction of mandatory sentencing legislation. 
Consequently, the Labor Opposition did not actively campaign against 
mandatory sentencing, likely because of the law’s electoral appeal. It took the 
suicide of an Indigenous boy, sentenced under the Northern Territory 
mandatory sentencing regime, for the media and the wider community to start 
denouncing the laws. However, despite a short barrage of criticism from the 
media and some in the wider community, there were minimal changes made 
to the Northern Territory regime (although the laws were abolished with the 
election of the Labor Government in the Northern Territory in 2001). The 
Western Australia Government still continues to operate their mandatory 
sentencing regime. The Australian wider community continued to generally 
demand tough law and order policies and State and Territory Governments 
continued to implement these policies (Tickner 2001, 79). 
Those in the wider community who are apathetic or hostile to 
Indigenous socio-economic disadvantage have often failed to understand the 
importance of recognising the past. They generally do not consider issues 
such as the invasion, massacres, genocide or stolen generations as relevant 
to alleviating Indigenous socio-economic disadvantage, instead arguing that 
“colourblind” policies should apply to anyone who is in a poor socio-economic 
situation (see Albrechtsen 2002, 40). Critics of the stolen generations inquiry 
illustrated this attitude of not recognising the past with their ‘white blindfold’ 
views of Australian history. This failure to acknowledge the past by some non-
Indigenous people significantly contributes to the failure to improve 
Indigenous socio-economic conditions. Jackson and Ward (1999, 438) argued 
that: 
 
Reconciliation always begins with acknowledgement or, more 
colloquially, ‘truth telling’ … In Australia, there is a need to 
acknowledge that the benefits now enjoyed by some have been 
at the expense of incalculable suffering to others .… If 
contemporary Aboriginal health is accepted to be a 
manifestation of a population dying in despair, anger and 
disillusionment, then reconciliation is fundamental … 
reconciliation becomes the foundation for health services 
development.  
 
Many non-Indigenous people in the wider community do not share 
these views discussed above. They see themselves as having progressive 
and supportive attitudes towards Indigenous issues. Nevertheless, many of 
these non-Indigenous people also hold opinions that have contributed to the 
failure to develop a national commitment to address Indigenous disadvantage 
in the 1990s. These opinions include a failure to appreciate the importance of 
history, a reluctance to criticise progressive policies on Indigenous issues, 
regardless of the effect of the policies, seeing Indigenous people and issues 
in an essentialist manner, and avoiding discussing Indigenous socio-
economic disadvantage such as domestic violence and substance abuse. 
These views have contributed to many ‘progressive’ non-Indigenous people 
failing both to honestly appraise Indigenous socio-economic conditions and to 
conduct an open dialogue of the most appropriate measures to address the 
conditions. These views have also largely prevented many progressive non-
Indigenous people from lobbying governments to implement urgently needed 
policy reforms. Pearson (2002d) argued that these views have contributed to 
the worsening of Indigenous socio-economic conditions and that some of the 
most “decisive but unrecognised problems in the reconciliation process” are 
the “knee-jerk responses” from “pro-reconciliation, liberally minded 
Australians” to Indigenous socio-economic conditions; these responses “are 
not only futile but positively destructive” as they fail to address Indigenous 
needs. 
One attitude held by many progressive non-Indigenous people that has 
contributed to the failure to develop a national commitment to address 
Indigenous disadvantage concerns their understandings of history. These 
non-Indigenous people, while not rejecting the importance of history like 
others in the wider community, have still often failed to develop much 
awareness of the complexities of the past and the connections between the 
past and the present. For instance, past government policies such as 
assimilation are often condemned without also looking at how the wider 
Australian society was extremely supportive of these policies. This attitude 
then can lead to the conclusion that it was only the government and some 
sections of society but not all of society that was to blame. As Neill (2002, 
187) argued: 
 
By selectively targeting church and former welfare authorities, 
protectors and politicians who are now (conveniently) dead, 
contemporary critics of assimilation let the broader society off 
the hook. Far from being the handiwork of a few zealots and 
‘holy terrors’, the policy and practice of assimilation was 
embraced by institutions and individuals across Australia (see 
also Schaap 2000, 4; Cowlishaw 2000, 22). 
 
This view then enables many progressive non-Indigenous people to 
inappropriately distance themselves from the past. An understanding of how 
the wider Australian society for most of the 20th Century supported policies of 
assimilation could assist contemporary society in understanding how to more 
adequately resolve Indigenous and non-Indigenous relations.  
Many non-Indigenous people also failed to distinguish between the 
various circumstances and motives of those directly involved in past 
government policies. As Cowlishaw (2000, 21) argued, “to understand the 
past means understanding its moral complexities and ambiguities”. To brand 
all those involved in the policy of assimilation, for example, as having 
genocidal intent, masks the significant differences of circumstances and 
motives involved with different cases, and thus fails to identify those who were 
guilty of genocide (see Gaita 1999, 125; Manne 2001, 30). Further, “there 
appears to be little to suggest that supporters of reconciliation have any 
knowledge of the many people who since the early nineteenth century sought 
to ameliorate Aboriginal conditions and reform attitudes, policies and 
outcomes” (Reynolds 1998, 250-251). 
Another issue concerning the assimilation policies also illustrates the 
failure of many non-Indigenous people to understand the complexities of the 
past. This involves the debate about whether some Indigenous children were 
removed with parental consent or were stolen. Neill (2002, 138-139) criticised 
those supporters of the stolen generations who have argued that there was no 
need to investigate how Indigenous children were removed from their families: 
“By insisting that the circumstances surrounding a child’s removal were 
irrelevant, advocates of the stolen generations were exhibiting their own brand 
of denialism; their own form of not wanting to know”.   
Further, the eagerness of some non-Indigenous peoples “to condemn 
and vilify settlers and governments as deliberately genocidal racists” implies 
“that we today are innocent, exonerated from responsibility by our 
understanding of the murderous or wrong headed past” (Cowlishaw 2000, 
21). Thus, these progressive non-Indigenous people have often focussed on 
condemning the past to the exclusion of looking at concerns and 
responsibilities in the present. For example, while many non-Indigenous 
people, and some sections of the print media, have supported an official 
apology to the stolen generations, fewer have advocated that contemporary 
Australia should be responsible for enacting other types of restitution, such as 
compensation (Neill 2002, 122; see also ANTaR 2001, 26). Also, many 
progressive non-Indigenous people have blamed the significant levels of 
Indigenous socio-economic disadvantage predominately on the history of race 
relations in Australia, rather than also exploring other, more contemporary 
causes of this disadvantage. Cowlishaw (2000, 21-22) cautioned against 
these attitudes of some progressive non-Indigenous people: 
 
The complacent moral fervour, even zealotry, of some who 
support the Aboriginal cause may be as much a barrier to an 
understanding of Aborigines and their interests as are the 
infamous mythic rednecks we all love to hate. We whitefellas 
seem as unable as ever to examine either our own moral 
assumptions or the real experiences of Aboriginal people today.  
 
Many non-Indigenous people, in failing to understand and learn from 
history, are repeating the mistakes made by previous generations of 
progressive non-Indigenous people, such as working with Indigenous people 
in ways that are culturally inappropriate, simplistic, patronising and 
disempowering. Pearson (2000b, 50) argued:  
 
Not all white people involved in Aboriginal affairs have been 
malign, many have come with good intentions. This is now a 
widespread model of governance – the ‘white dictator’ model 
has given way to the ‘white saviour/servant’ model. The good 
hearted missionaries of earlier days are the predecessors of the 
current mob … the problem is that their concept of themselves 
as saviours of Aboriginal people is destructive. It has ‘passive 
welfare’ written all over it. 
 
In order to develop a national commitment to address Indigenous 
disadvantage, it is essential that non-Indigenous people, particularly those 
working with Indigenous people, understand the importance of jointly 
developing and implementing culturally appropriate, holistic, realistic and 
empowering strategies. Further, non-Indigenous people need to recognise the 
diversity amongst Indigenous peoples and cultures throughout Australia and 
should not assume that strategies found successful in one area would 
therefore succeed for all Indigenous communities. Also, progressive non-
Indigenous people, in a similar vein to Governments, need to both support the 
concept of Indigenous self-determination and accept that the enacting of this 
policy does not absolve them of responsibility over Indigenous issues. 
Another attitude held by many progressive non-Indigenous people that 
contributes to the lack of a national commitment is a reluctance to criticise 
those progressive policies that have replaced the discredited policies of the 
past. An example of this reluctance involves the policy of bilingual education 
in the Northern Territory. Introduced in 1973 by the Whitlam Labor 
Government, the aim of bilingual education was to encourage the literacy of 
Indigenous students in both English and their Indigenous language. Despite 
the policy being hailed as enabling Indigenous communities to be involved in 
their children’s education and recognising the value of Indigenous cultures 
and languages, there have been a number of concerns with the policy. These 
concerns include inappropriate teacher training, inadequate and insufficient 
resources, inexperienced teachers, a high turnover of teachers, a lack of 
linguists or English as a Second Language teachers, and occasional hostility 
(Collins 1999, 121-122). In 1998, the Northern Territory Country Liberal 
Government decided to focus on English literacy and phase out special 
funding for bilingual schools. This decision ignored the benefits of bilingual 
education and was made without consulting Indigenous people. However, in 
criticising this decision, opponents have often concentrated on the 
Government attack on Indigenous self-determination (which should be 
criticised) and have largely failed to examine why the policy of bilingual 
education has not improved the educational outcomes for Indigenous 
students and how concerns with the policy could be addressed (see HREOC 
2000, 66; Morrissey 2003, 56).  
Along similar lines, some non-Indigenous researchers are reluctant to 
conduct research that, despite offering the possibilities of providing useful 
feedback on socio-economic conditions, could be unfairly construed as being 
guided by past discredited Indigenous policies. For example, there is a lack of 
research on a number of educational disparities in the Northern Territory. 
Some bureaucrats, school principals and researchers are concerned that 
researching attendance levels is a throwback to the oppressive, paternalistic 
policies of the assimilation era, and accordingly do not often define the 
meaning of attendance and sometimes expand the concept of attendance to 
incorporate watching football matches (see Collins 1999, 157). 
Another attitude held by many progressive non-Indigenous people that 
could restrict the fostering of a national commitment is one of seeing 
Indigenous people and issues in an essentialist manner. These non-
Indigenous people often hold romantic views that posit Indigenous peoples 
and cultures as ‘noble savages’, which can often hinder attempts to improve 
Indigenous socio-economic disadvantage. For example, Neill (2002, 241) 
argued, “studying English has been cast as a threat to tribal culture. This has 
contributed to a crisis of illiteracy among indigenous students in the Northern 
Territory”. Foley (1999, 31) argued that these non-Indigenous people:  
 
still regard Indigenous people in an essentialist way. This results 
in an unwitting romanticising and idealising of the Aboriginal 
peoples and their ‘heroic’ struggle for justice … A 
comprehensive ignorance about the people, culture, political 
history and landscape of Koori Australia is something that 
progressive political groups too often share with the rest of 
white-Australia (see also Pearson 2002d; Morrissey 2003, 56). 
 
Finally, many progressive non-Indigenous people are also reluctant to 
discuss issues of Indigenous socio-economic disadvantage, particularly 
issues of community health, such as domestic violence, substance abuse and 
out-of-custody suicides (Pearson 2002c). The reasons for this reticence 
amongst these non-Indigenous people and elements of the media include a 
fear that discussing these issues could cause an increase in racism and a 
desire to only discuss issues that could be posited in the positive stories that 
were so favoured by the formal reconciliation process. An example of this was 
the reaction by the wider community in the late 1990s to the release of several 
reports on domestic violence in Indigenous communities. Despite the 
shocking revelations contained in these reports and the escalating levels of 
domestic violence, they were virtually ignored by the wider society (see 
Brunton 2001, 21).  
Even when these issues are raised, they are often attributed entirely to 
the historical legacies of invasion and colonisation. Noel Pearson argued that, 
while accepting that dispossession is the “ultimate explanation”, other factors 
besides historical legacies could also play a role in Indigenous socio-
economic disadvantage (Pearson 2002a, 12; Pearson 2000a; Pearson 
2000b). These factors, Pearson argued, include welfare dependency, a high 
availability of alcohol and other drugs, significant amounts of idle time, and 
lack of community condemnation of social problems (Pearson 2000a, 38-39; 
Pearson 2002c; see also Gordon 2001, 79). Pearson (2000a, 24) argued that 
issues such as substance abuse needed to be treated as a health condition, 
not as a symptom of dispossession, as this categorisation absolves 
Indigenous people and communities from attempting to combat substance 
abuse. Manne (2002, 13) asserted that these arguments from Pearson, as 
well as those from Indigenous academics and commentators such as Boni 
Robertson and Marcia Langton, challenge progressive supporters of 
reconciliation - “the sentimental, romantic, suburban, anti-Howard, moral 
middle class” - to address socio-economic issues such as domestic violence 




One of the main goals of the ten-year Australian formal reconciliation process 
was to foster a national commitment to address Indigenous socio-economic 
disadvantage in the areas of health, overrepresentation in custody, education, 
housing and employment. This goal was not achieved by the conclusion of the 
reconciliation process at the end of 2000. In this paper, I argued that there 
were two interrelated factors that substantially contributed to the failure of this 
goal to develop a national commitment. These factors were the Indigenous 
Affairs policies of governments and the attitudes towards Indigenous socio-
economic disadvantage held by many non-Indigenous people. 
 
It is imperative that we, as an Australian community, learn from the mistakes 
of the reconciliation decade. Overall Indigenous socio-economic disadvantage 
has worsened since the conclusion of the reconciliation process. 
Commonwealth, State and Territory Governments are making similar 
mistakes to those their predecessors committed in the 1990s. Many in the 
wider community remain apathetic, hostile or uncertain concerning the level of 
Indigenous socio-economic disadvantage. Indigenous people, communities 
and organisations remain substantially disempowered in their capacity to 
improve their socio-economic outcomes. A national commitment to address 
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